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Attorneys Must Manifest Express Authority in
Order to Create a Binding Settlement Agreement on
Behalf of Their Client: Reutzel v. Douglas
CIVIL PROCEDURE - SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS - APPARENT AND
EXPRESS AUTHORITY - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
an attorney may enter into a binding settlement agreement on
behalf of his client only if the attorney is acting with express au-
thority.
Reutzel v. Douglas, 870 A.2d 787 (Pa. 2005).
On November 23, 1994, Mark Reutzel lost control of his car
along an interstate, crossed over the median into opposing traffic,
and collided head-on with another car.' Mark's wife Rozanna, the
only passenger in the car, sustained serious back injuries which
caused her to become paraplegic.! Rozanna underwent back sur-
gery at Allegheny General Hospital (hereinafter "AGH") under the
care of Dr. Richard Douglas.' Dr. Douglas admitted to incorrectly
placing a pedicle screw in the vertebrae of Rozanna's back, which
further aggravated her condition.4 In 1996, the improperly im-
planted screw was removed from Rozanna's back, and the
Reutzels filed suit against Dr. Douglas and AGH for the allegedly
negligent surgical procedure.'
The parties entered into negotiations to settle the case in 2002,
but a personality conflict between the Reutzels' attorney, Paul
Danielsen, and the attorney for Dr. Douglas, Diane Barr Quinlin,
complicated the settlement.6 Danielsen and Quinlin often com-
municated either in writing, or through AGH's attorney, Terry
Cavanaugh, who acted as their intermediary.7
In an attempt to reach an agreement, Danielsen left Cavanaugh
a voicemail message on July 30, 2002, which said:
1. Reutzel v. Douglas, 870 A.2d 787, 788 (Pa. 2005).
2. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 788.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Dr. Douglas later admitted that he improperly placed the screw in Rozanna's
back, which allegedly aggravated her injuries. Id.
6. Id.
7. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 788.
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Before I have a knockdown drag out of any kind with
[Quinlin], my thought is if you could talk to her first, you
guys get us a hundred, contribute what you want, I will
make it go away. I don't have client consent, but I'm not
going to come back to you and say $125,000, I can guar-
antee you that. A hundred and it all goes poof 8
Quinlin, upon receiving the message from Cavanaugh, informed
Danielsen that she would be out of the country.9 She instructed
Danielsen to temporarily discuss the settlement with John Cleary,
Dr. Douglas' insurance agent.'1
Cleary informed Danielsen on August 7, 2002, that Dr. Douglas
had agreed to settle the suit for $100,000.11 When Quinlin re-
turned to the country, she believed the case had been settled for
$100,000, which was initially confirmed by Cavanaugh. 12  Cava-
naugh later warned Quinlin that subsequent to the establishment
of the settlement amount, Danielsen contacted Cavanaugh to say
that he may need more money to settle the case on behalf of the
Reutzels. 13
In response to Danielsen's request for more money, Quinlin and
Cavanaugh filed a Joint Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement
(hereinafter "Petition") on October 7, 2002.1' They asserted that
8. Id. On August 2, 2002, Cavanaugh, after receiving Danielsen's voicemail, sent
Danielsen a letter attempting to put the voicemail's pertinent facts into writing. The letter,
in part, stated:
Dear Paul,
First it is important to note that you have not made a commitment to me yet.
Nonetheless, what harm would there be in a letter that I direct to you with a
copy to [Quinlin] as follows:
Dear Paul,
I do appreciate the tone and tenor of our recent conversations.
You have indicated to me that you are prepared to recommend to your
client that she abandon all claims against Allegheny General Hospital so
that you can concentrate exclusively on your co-defendant, Dr. Douglas.
Because you have advised that you and counsel for the neurosurgeon are
beginning negotiations, I see no point in discontinuing the action as to
my client and amending the caption at present. If negotiations break




Id. at 789 n.1 (citing Pa. Super. Ct. Op. at 8-9 (Johnson, J., dissenting)).





14. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 788.
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an offer had been made in the July 30 voicemail to settle the case
for $100,000, and that offer had been accepted when Cleary and
Danielsen spoke on August 7.V5 In response to the Petition, both
Danielsen and the Reutzels claimed to have interpreted the
voicemail and subsequent discussions to be part of an ongoing ne-
gotiation, not an offer and acceptance for a definite settlement
amount.
8
The trial court granted the Petition, ordering AGH and Dr.
Douglas to pay $100,000 to the Reutzels." Specifically, the court
interpreted Danielsen's July 30 voicemail to have communicated
his ability to settle the suit on behalf of the Reutzels, even though
he openly stated that he did not have their consent. 8 Addition-
ally, the court held that Cavanaugh and Quinlin had relied on
Danielsen's representation that he had the capability to settle the
suit on behalf of the Reutzels. 19 Relying on Hannington v. Trustees
of the University of Pennsylvania," the trial court concluded that
an attorney acting with apparent authority2' is sufficient to bind
his client.22 On appeal, the superior court affirmed the trial court's
decision, which determined that apparent authority was present. 3
The Reutzels appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,





19. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 788-89.
20. 809 A.2d 406, 408 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). Hannington held that, under the doctrine
of apparent authority, a settlement agreement may be enforced when a third party has a
reasonable belief that the principal's lawyer had the authority to settle the case, whether or
not this authority actually exists. Hannington, 809 A.2d at 408.
21. Apparent authority is defined as, "authority that a principal intentionally confers
on an agent or authority that the agent reasonably believes he or she has as a result of the
agent's dealings with the principal. Apparent authority can be express or implied."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 142 (8th ed. 2004).
22. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 789.
23. Id. at 789. Justice Johnson dissented in the superior court's opinion. Id. In his
opinion, Danielsen's explicit disavowment of his authority to settle the case on the Reutzels'
behalf prevented any reasonable reliance on the part of Cavanaugh and Quinlin. Id. Spe-
cifically, Justice Johnson referred to evidence of continued negotiations between Cava-
naugh and Danielsen, such as the letter Cavanaugh drafted on August 2, which appeared
to be a continuation of negotiations following the July 30 voicemail. Id. In addition, Jus-
tice Johnson stated that the parties' failure to tender a release following the July 30 voice-
mail was further evidence that none of the parties believed the case had been settled.
Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 789. Justice Johnson felt a lack of apparent authority on behalf of
Danielsen prevented him from creating a binding settlement agreement. Id.
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apparent authority was sufficient to create a binding settlement.24
They argued that Danielsen's express statement that he was act-
ing without client consent prevented him from having the neces-
sary authority to negotiate a settlement agreement on their be-
half.25
The primary issue addressed by the court was whether Daniel-
sen exhibited the authority necessary to bind the Reutzels in an
oral settlement agreement. 6 The court explored both apparent
and express authority27 in order to determine which type of au-
thority was best supported by Pennsylvania precedent.28 Addi-
tionally, the majority opinion considered whether Danielsen's oral
settlement attempt was fraudulent, in which case, the settlement
agreement would be upheld regardless of what type of authority
Danielsen exhibited.29
Justice Nigro, writing for the majority," reiterated the well-
established rule in Pennsylvania that clients can only be bound by
an attorney acting with express authority.3' Since Danielsen did
not have express authority, the settlement agreement was inva-
lid.2  Furthermore, the court determined that Danielsen's repre-
sentations to Dr. Douglas and AGH regarding the settlement
agreement were not fraudulent.33
In order for the court to reach its holding, it had to first under-
stand the lower courts' rationale, as well as their principal reli-
ance on Hannington v. Trustees of the University of Pennsyl-
vania.4 In Hannington, the superior court held that a settlement
agreement which the plaintiffs attorney executed with apparent
24. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted this appeal under a plenary scope of
review, since the issue in this case involved a question of law. Stoner v. Stoner, 819 A.2d
529, 530 n.1 (Pa. 2003).
25. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 789.
26. Id.
27. Express authority is defined as, "authority given to the agent by explicit agreement,
either orally or in writing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (8th ed. 2004).
28. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 789-90.
29. Id. at 792. See also Rothman v. Fillette, 469 A.2d 543, 545 (Pa. 1983), (upholding
the validity of a settlement agreement fraudulently negotiated by the plaintiffs attorney).
The court decided the party who accredited the fraudulent attorney should bear the loss of
the settlement agreement before any other innocent party. Rothman, 469 A.2d at 545.
30. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 787. Joining Justice Nigro in the majority opinion were Jus-
tices Castille and Saylor. Id. Chief Justice Cappy authored a concurring opinion which
Justice Newman joined. Id. at 793 (Cappy, C.J., concurring). Justice Eakin wrote a sepa-
rate concurring opinion which Justice Baer joined. Id. at 795 (Eakin, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 789-90 (majority opinion).
32. Id. at 789.
33. Id. at 793.
34. Id. at 790.
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authority, but without the plaintiffs consent, was valid.35 Because
the attorney's actions caused the opposing party to reasonably be-
lieve the attorney had the right to exercise this authority on the
plaintiffs behalf, the settlement agreement was upheld."
Rejecting the Hannington court's holding that apparent author-
ity is sufficient, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court further explored
Rothman v. Fillette,37 the case on which the Hannington court
based its holding.38 In Rothman, an attorney fraudulently negoti-
ated a settlement on his client's behalf, forging his client's signa-
ture on the settlement agreement and pocketing the settlement
funds.39 When the client realized he had been defrauded, his peti-
tion to re-open the case was granted, but the court still upheld the
settlement agreement.4" The court decided if an innocent party
had to sustain a loss for the fraudulent actions of his attorney, it
should be the party who "put the wrongdoer in a position of trust
and confidence and thus enabled him to perpetrate the wrong.' 1
Contrasting the Hannington and Rothman opinions, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Reutzel emphasized that the superior
court's analysis in Hannington misinterpreted Rothman; accord-
ingly, the Reutzel court overturned the Hannington opinion.42 The
Rothman court's decision to uphold the settlement agreement had
nothing to do with the attorney's apparent authority, but instead
was based on the principle that the party who hired the fraudu-
lent attorney must suffer a loss on the settlement amount before
any other innocent party.43 Hannington misread this opinion as
stating that apparent authority alone was sufficient to make an
attorney's action binding upon his client.
4
After overruling Hannington, the majority examined the
Rothman holding and determined that it, too, was inapplicable to
35. Hannington, 809 A.2d at 407-08.
36. Id. at 411.
37. 469A.2d at 543.
38. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 792. The majority found that, "Hannington clearly misstated
the law emanating from Rothman and the lower courts erred in relying on Hannington's
misstatement to find that the Reutzels were b6und to the negotiated settlement here." Id.
39. Rothman, 469 A.2d at 544-45.
40. Id. at 545.
41. Id. (quoting Rykaczewski v. Kerry Home, Inc., 161 A.2d 924, 926 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1960)).
42. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 792.
43. Id. at 791.
44. Id. at 792.
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the Reutzels' case.4 5 The Reutzels alleged that Danielsen misled
them; however, they did not characterize any of the misleading
actions he took on their behalf as fraudulent. 46
After the majority rejected the principal case relied on by the
lower courts, it followed the well-established precedent in Penn-
sylvania that an attorney who has exhibited express authority can
create a legally binding settlement agreement on behalf of his cli-
ent.47 Pennsylvania's requirement of express authority was ulti-
mately intended to protect the client, since entering into a settle-
ment agreement often involved the forfeiture of substantial legal
rights, and should only be entered into knowingly by all parties.48
Client knowledge, according to the court, is heightened under the
express authority doctrine because the client must specifically
grant his attorney the authority to act on his behalf.49 The major-
ity held that any actions taken by an attorney without the client's
specific grant of authority are not binding." Concluding that
Danielsen did not possess express authority, the court ultimately
decided that the oral settlement agreement reached on behalf of
the Reutzels was not binding.5
Chief Justice Cappy joined the majority opinion, but wrote sepa-
rately in order to recommend that Pennsylvania adopt the doc-
trine of apparent authority instead of the doctrine of express au-
thority.52 Specifically, Chief Justice Cappy preferred the apparent
authority doctrine for its "proper balancing of the competing poli-
cies of the client's right to control settlement, protection of third
parties, and [a] strong public policy in favor of settlement."53
45. Id. at 790. The court subsequently granted allowance of an appeal in Hannington,
but the parties requested a discontinuation of the case. Id. at 790 n.3.
46. Id. at 792.
47. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 789-90. See Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 66 (Pa. 1989);
Archbishop v. Karlak, 299 A.2d 294 (Pa. 1973); Starling v. W. Erie Ave. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
3 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1939); McLaughlin v. Monaghan, 138 A. 79 (Pa. 1927).
48. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 790.
49. Id.
50. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 cmt. c (1958).
51. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 793.
52. Id. (Cappy, C.J., concurring). Justice Newman joined Chief Justice Cappy's concur-
ring opinion. Id.
53. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS section 27
(2000), which provides apparent authority is present if, "in dealings with a third person ...
the tribunal or third person reasonably assumes that the lawyer is authorized to do the act
on the basis of the client's (and not the lawyer's) manifestations of such authorization."
Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 794 (Cappy, C.J., concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 27 (2000)).
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In his concurrence, Chief Justice Cappy expanded upon several
faults in the doctrine of express authority that would be alleviated
if the court adopted the doctrine of apparent authority.54 Chief
Justice Cappy first explored the difficulty that each party involved
in the settlement negotiations faces when trying to gauge whether
a particular attorney is acting under the express authority of his
client.55 He was particularly concerned that the evidence needed
to prove the existence of express authority would frequently fall
under the protection of the attorney-client privilege,56 preventing
the other parties from obtaining such evidence.
A second flaw that Chief Justice Cappy found inherent in the
doctrine of express authority was that it punished the client for
his attorney's actions in falsely manifesting express client consent
in order to reach a legally binding settlement agreement.58  Con-
versely, he distinguished the doctrine of apparent authority and
its focus on the actions of the client - not the attorney - in decid-
ing whether the appropriate level of authority exists.59 Chief Jus-
tice Cappy believed that the doctrine of apparent authority cor-
rectly places fault on the client for any misrepresentations he pro-
vides to the other parties while attempting to reach a settlement
agreement. 0 Specifically, he noted that fairness prevails when the
court chooses to uphold the settlement agreement against the cli-
ent's wishes because the client's misrepresentations, instead of the
attorney's, caused the other parties to believe a binding agreement
had been reached.6 '
The doctrine of apparent authority, according to Chief Justice
Cappy, better served Pennsylvania's public policy goal of encour-
aging parties to enter into settlement agreements. 2 Under this
doctrine, he believed clients were more willing to enter into set-
tlement agreements knowing they maintained ultimate control
over their attorney's authority to settle their case.63 Furthermore,
54. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 794 (Cappy, C.J., concurring).
55. Id.
56. Attorney-client privilege is defined as, "the client's right to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications between the client
and the attorney." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1235 (8th ed. 2004).





62. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 795 (Cappy, C.J., concurring). See Muhammad v. Strass-
burger, 587 A.2d 1346, 1350-51 (Pa. 1991).
63. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 795 (Cappy, C.J., concurring).
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Chief Justice Cappy commented that the risk of a client's attorney
falsely exhibiting express authority and creating a binding settle-
ment agreement was alleviated under the doctrine of apparent
authority.' In his opinion, the rigidity of the apparent authority
doctrine prevented settlement agreements from being reneged be-
cause the client maintained a heightened level of involvement in
reaching the settlement agreement.65 This was a benefit which
Chief Justice Cappy believed extended to all parties involved in a
settlement negotiation, since they could be assured that their rea-
sonable reliance on the client's manifestations throughout negotia-
tions would be upheld in a court of law.66
Justice Eakin wrote a separate concurring opinion, which Jus-
tice Baer joined, in order to express the view in favor of imposing
limits on the majority opinion.67 The majority, according to Jus-
tices Eakin and Baer, erred in its determination that apparent
authority was present in this case.6" Both justices agreed that
once the majority correctly determined that neither express au-
thority nor fraudulent behavior was present in this case, the court
should have concluded the settlement agreement was not binding
without delving into a discussion of apparent authority.69
For over one hundred years, Pennsylvania has held that a cli-
ent's approval is necessary in order to create a binding settlement
agreement.7" In Gable v. Hain,71 the court examined whether Ga-
ble's attorney, Samuel Baird, had the authority to settle the case
by accepting money from Hain without Gable's knowledge.72 The
rule adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, similar to that
in effect today, denied an attorney the power to act outside the
scope of his profession by settling a case without the client's ex-
press consent.73 The court held that Baird's acceptance of Hain's
payment was not a legally binding settlement because Gable had




67. Id. (Eakin, J., concurring).
68. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 795 (Eakin, J., concurring).
69. Id.
70. Gable v. Hain, 1 Pen. & W. 264 (Pa. 1830).






The issue of an attorney settling a client's cause of action with-
out express client consent was addressed by the Commonwealth
over fifty years later in Mackey's Heirs v. Adair.75 The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that an attorney's actions to settle a
case were not effective unless the attorney had first been author-
ized by his client."6 In further exploring the boundaries of the at-
torney-client relationship, the court noted the absence of prece-
dent in Pennsylvania, among other jurisdictions, which would
have provided an attorney with the power to settle a case without
first being expressly sanctioned by his client.7 In the absence of
client consent, the court acknowledged two situations in which an
attorney's unauthorized actions would be binding." Legal settle-
ments may be made without prior client consent when the client is
present while his attorney performs the unauthorized actions and
fails to object, or when the client subsequently acts upon and rec-
ognizes the attorney's initially unauthorized actions as being
valid. 9
The majority in Mackey's Heirs rationalized the requirement of
express authority as a way to promote settlement agreements,
acknowledging Pennsylvania's long-standing deference toward
arbitration as opposed to traditional trials." In addition, the
court noted that the express authority required for settlement
agreements prevented an attorney from having a "dangerous"
level of control over a client's cause of action, since the client re-
tained ultimate authority over his case.81
In the twentieth century, the legality of unauthorized attorney
settlement agreements continued to plague the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court.82 In 1927, McLaughlin v. Monaghan83 raised the is-
sue of the legal effect of a settlement letter written by McLaugh-
lin's attorney to the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company.' The
letter agreed to hold the transit company harmless in exchange for
information regarding one of the other parties involved in the ac-
75. 99 Pa. 143 (Pa. 1881).





81. Mackey's Heirs, 99 Pa. at 143.
82. McLaughlin v. Monaghan, 138 A. 79 (Pa. 1927).
83. 138A. at 79.
84. Id. at 80.
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cident.85 McLaughlin had not authorized the letter written by her
attorney and did not wish to release the Philadelphia Rapid Tran-
sit Company from liability.86 In the absence of any proof that
McLaughlin had authorized to her attorney to write such a letter,
the court held that the letter was not a binding release of the
Transit Company's liability." Specifically, the court denied that
an attorney was capable of surrendering his client's substantial
rights without his client's prior knowledge and approval of the
settlement agreement, or without his client's subsequent ratifica-
tion of such agreement.88
Over a decade later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed
the precedent in this Commonwealth which addressed the type of
authority an attorney must have in order to bind his client.89 In
Starling v. West Erie Avenue Building & Loan Assn," in the ab-
sence of finding express authority on behalf of the attorney, the
court examined whether implied or apparent authority provided
the attorney with the power to lawfully act on his client's behalf.9'
The majority held that, based upon its review of a century of
Pennsylvania cases, the existence of valid authority between an
attorney and client excluded both implied and apparent authority,
thereby making express authority a requirement for any attorney
to validly act upon his client's behalf.92
In its rationale, the Starling majority stated that a client's act of
merely retaining an attorney was not an act explicit enough to
provide the attorney with express authority.93 Placing part of the
burden on the opposing party, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated its expectation that every party should scrutinize and in-
quire as to the authority under which the opposing party's attor-
ney is acting.94
In 1973, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was again faced with
the decision of what type of authority was considered persuasive





89. Starling v. W. Erie Ave. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 3 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1939).
90. 3 A.2d at 387.






vania.95 Before specifically addressing the issue in Archbishop v.
Karlak," the court noted two divergent views that were becoming
prominent in jurisdictions across the United States.97 Some juris-
dictions held that the implied authority of an attorney was suffi-
cient to bind a client, while other jurisdictions mandated that the
attorney act under the client's "direction, knowledge or consent" in
order to make a binding settlement agreement.98
It was decided in Archbishop that Pennsylvania has tradition-
ally taken the position that, unless a client expressly manifests
consent to his attorney, the attorney cannot execute a valid set-
tlement agreement on behalf of the client.99 This view was ulti-
mately derived from the Commonwealth's classification of the cli-
ent as the master of his case, allowing the client to maintain com-
plete control in both litigation and settlement matters.00
While the Archbishop court admitted that attorneys have
broader powers than most agents, the court, nonetheless, rein-
forced the rule that an attorney's apparent or implied authority
will not validate unauthorized actions that would essentially sur-
render the client's substantial rights or impose new liabilities
upon the client.01 According to the majority, attorneys have gen-
eral authority while conducting matters involved in the course of
litigation; however, this general authority ends once litigation
over a cause of action ceases, and express authority is required
once the settlement process begins.'
95. Archbishop v. Karlak, 299 A.2d 294, 296 (Pa. 1973).
96. 299 A.2d at 294.
97. Id. at 296.
98. Id. (citing 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 175 (2004) (In Archbishop, this citation
is incorrectly cited as 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 128)). See also 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attor-
neys at Law section 173 (2004), which states that the mere retention of an attorney does
not provide the attorney with the authority necessary to settle a client's cause of action. 7
AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 173. Apparent authority is only to be relied upon when a
party has notice of his or her attorney's actions and fails to disavow those actions. Id. In
that specific circumstance, the opposing party can reasonably rely on the validity of the
attorney's actions even though express client consent is lacking. Id.
99. Archbishop, 299 A.2d at 296.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 297. See also Lodowski v. Roenick, 307 A.2d 439, 440 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).
The Lodowski court stated:
The general rule of law is that the ordinary employment of an attorney to rep-
resent a client with respect to litigation does not of itself give the attorney the
implied or apparent authority to bind the client with settlement or compromise,
and that in the absence of express authority he cannot do so.
Lodowski, 307 A.2d at 440.
102. Archbishop, 299 A.2d at 297 (citing Lipschutz v. Lipschutz, 188 A. 556 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1936)). See also STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE, vol. 1, chap. 4, section 90 (2005),
Spring 2006 543
Duquesne Law Review
Within five months of the Archbishop opinion, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court followed the recent decisions of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court when it struck down the validity of a settlement
agreement enacted without a client's express authority in Lo-
dowski v. Roenick.' ° The majority rejected the lower court's no-
tion that "full authority" should be considered equivalent to ap-
parent authority. 114 Instead, the superior court decided that "full
authority" demanded the same level of attorney-client consent as
the doctrine of express authority.'
In the Lodowski opinion, the Pennsylvania Superior Court sug-
gested that the legislature codify the existing case law to more
clearly define the express authority with which an attorney must
act in order to create a binding settlement agreement. 6 Specifi-
cally, the majority recommended that express authority from the
client be manifested: 1) from a writing that gives consent, 2) from
the client's presence at the time the settlement agreement is for-
mulated, or 3) from any other method which provides the court
with substantial proof that the client had given his attorney direct
consent to enact the settlement agreement. 7 In acknowledging
that the requirement of express consent is intended to protect both
the client and the attorney, the Lodowski court recommended that
the legislature adopt its suggestion to more formally cement what
express consent entails.' 8
In Rothman v. Fillette,109 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ex-
amined a new dimension of unauthorized attorney settlement
agreements."0 The Rothman court was faced with an attorney
who manifested apparent authority in settling his client's case,
but did so without client authorization."' Not only were the attor-
ney's actions unauthorized, but his signing of the client settlement
which states that an attorney's general authority is meant to allow the attorney the ability
to enter into agreements during litigation that are necessary, and that solely affect proce-
dure or remedy. Id. Settlement agreements are distinguishable from litigation matters
because they affect the cause of action itself, as contrasted with affecting procedure or
remedy. Id. Since agreements which affect the cause of action cannot be considered inci-
dental, general authority on behalf of an attorney is not sufficient in the settlement phase.
Id.
103. 307 A.2d 439, 441.





109. 469 A.2d 543 (Pa. 1983).
110. Rothman, 469 A.2d at 544.
111. Id. at 544-45.
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agreement and pocketing of the settlement funds rose to the level
of fraudulent behavior.' In examining the authority of an attor-
ney in a case involving fraud, the court held that the parties in-
teracting with the fraudulent attorney had reason to believe he
was acting under the express authority of the client; therefore, the
attorney's manifestation of authority was sufficient to bind his
client in the unauthorized settlement agreement."' The court's
rationale stated that if an innocent, settling party must suffer, it
should be the party who initially hired the fraudulent attorney,
even though that party did not ultimately authorize the settle-
ment agreement.
1 4
Rothman was not intended to impact the well-established hold-
ing in Pennsylvania that express authority, not apparent or im-
plied authority, is required before an attorney's settlement actions
will be binding upon his client."5 Instead, the Rothman holding
intended to address a narrow category of cases in which an attor-
ney acted fraudulently by exuding a false sense of authority to the
other parties involved in the settlement phase."6 Within the
Rothman opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinforced the
Commonwealth's long-standing requirement that an attorney
must have express authority in order to settle a client's cause of
action.
1 17
As the twenty-first century began, Pennsylvania maintained its
consistent stance that express authority is required to create a
valid, binding settlement agreement. 8 In Bennett v. Juzelenos,"'
the Bennetts believed a settlement agreement enacted by the
Juzelenos' attorney, Peterson, was a legally binding agreement.20
The Juzelenos denied that Peterson had authority to settle their
case, even though their son had told Peterson on the telephone
that he could settle the case for $6,000."' Peterson believed Juze-
112. Id. at 545.
113. Id. at 544-45.
114. Id. at 545.
115. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 791-92.
116. Id. (citing Keller v. N.J. Fidelity and Plate Glass Insur. Co., 159 A. 40 (Pa. 1932);
Mundorffv. Wickersham, 63 Pa. 87 (Pa. 1869)).
117. Rothman, 469 A.2d at 545 (citing Int'l Org. Masters, Mates and Pilots of Am., Local
No. 2 v. Int'l Org. Masters, Mates and Pilots of Am., Inc., 318 A.2d 918 (Pa. 1974);
Archbishop, 299 A.2d 294; McLaughlin, 138 A. 79; Lipschutz, 188 A. 556).
118. Bennett v. Juzelenos, 791 A.2d 403 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
119. 791 A.2d at 403.
120. Id. at 406.
121. Id. at 407.
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lenos' son had been authorized by the Juzelenos to instruct Peter-
son to settle the case.
122
The issue for the superior court to decide was whether the Juze-
lenos' son had the authority necessary to advise Peterson to settle
the case. 23 In the absence of express authority given by the Juze-
lenos themselves, the superior court had to determine whether the
apparent authority conveyed by the Juzelenos' son to Peterson
was sufficient to create a binding settlement agreement. 124 The
majority discussed Pennsylvania's infrequent use of the doctrine
of apparent authority, which mostly occurs in cases where a third
party conveys apparent authority to an agent, and the agent rea-
sonably believes that authority was manifested directly from the
principal to the third party.125  Finding that Peterson could not
have reasonably believed the Juzelenos' son was acting under ap-
parent authority, the majority held that the settlement agreement
was invalid due to Peterson's lack of authority.
2 6
Less than nine months after the Bennett opinion, the superior
court made an unprecedented ruling in Hannington v. Trustees of
the University of Pennsylvania.'27 In Hannington, the court exam-
ined whether, in the absence of express authority, an attorney's
actions could be binding under the doctrine of apparent author-
ity.'28 A settlement agreement was being negotiated between a
Ph.D. student and a university over tuition fees that the Ph.D.
student claimed were allegedly waived by the university. 29 In an
effort to reach a settlement, both attorneys negotiated what they
believed to be a final agreement, but the student refused to sign




123. Id. at 408.
124. Bennett, 791 A.2d at 408.
125. Id. at 408-09 (citing Revere Press, Inc. v. Blumberg, 246 A.2d 407, 410 (Pa. 1968)).
In Revere, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined apparent authority as:
[The] power to bind a principal which the principal has not actually granted
but which he leads persons with whom his agent deals to believe that he has
granted. Persons with whom the agent deals can reasonably believe that the
agent has power to bind his principal if, for instance, the principal knowingly
permits the agent to exercise such power or if the principal holds the agent out
as possessing such power.
Revere, 246 A.2d at 410.
126. Bennett, 791 A.2d at 408-09.
127. 809 A.2d 406 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
128. Hannington, 809 A.2d at 408.




Finding the settlement agreement to be valid, the superior court
held that the presence of apparent authority provided the stu-
dent's attorney with the power to settle the case."' The majority
interpreted the doctrine of apparent authority as sufficient to en-
force a settlement agreement in the absence of express authority
when the parties with whom the lawyer negotiated reasonably
believed that the lawyer had the authority to settle the case.1
3 2
The Hannington court's statement of the law regarding the au-
thority necessary to create a binding settlement agreement in
Pennsylvania was flawed, and it was later overturned by the
Reutzel court."3
The Hannington majority's incorrect statement of the authority
which Pennsylvania typically requires for settlement agreements
stemmed from a misinterpretation of the Rothman opinion.""
Specifically, the Hannington majority relied on Rothman as stat-
ing that, even in the absence of the fraud on part of the attorney,
the settlement agreement would be upheld under the doctrine of
apparent authority due to a reasonable belief imparted upon the
other parties that the negotiating attorney had the necessary au-
thority to settle his client's cause of action.'13 In addition, the ma-
jority relied on the Rothman court's finding that, as long as the
parties directly interacting with the attorney believed that he had
authority, they were not under any duty to determine the scope
and source of that authority."' The superior court in Hannington
used this reasoning as support for its decision that, as long as the
university reasonably believed the opposing party's attorney had
apparent authority, they did not have a duty to look further into
the attorney-client relationship to determine if that authority ac-
tually existed.
137
Furthermore, the majority in Hannington distinguished its
opinion from the majority opinion in Bennett, where the Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court held that the doctrine of apparent authority
was inapplicable for purposes of enforcing a settlement agree-
ment."' The Hannington court found the Bennett decision irrele-
131. Id. at 408.
132. Id. at 409.
133. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 792.
134. Hannington, 809 A.2d at 408-09.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 409 (quoting Rothman, 469 A.2d at 546-57).
137. Hannington, 809 A.2d at 410.
13& Id. at 410 n.4.
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vant because the attorney in Bennett could not have reasonably
believed that the Juzelenos' son had the necessary authority to
provide a settlement amount. 9 Also, the Hannington court ar-
gued that the attorney in Bennett could have looked further into
the questionable authority on the part of the Juzelenos' son by
contacting the Juzelenos directly, but chose not to do so. 14 Distin-
guishably, in Hannington, not only was there a reasonable belief
that the attorney had authority, but the university was barred,
because of ethical constraints, from looking any further into the
authority between the Ph.D. student and his attorney." For these
reasons, the Hannington court dismissed the Bennett holding and
relied solely on its misinterpretation of Rothman to uphold the
settlement agreement in the absence of express authority.
4 2
Prior to the Reutzel opinion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
and the Pennsylvania Superior Court did not endorse the same
rules of law regarding the authority necessary to create a binding
settlement agreement. The Reutzel court attempted to collectively
examine the pre-existing law by providing a brief history in its
opinion, which reinforced the requirement of express authority
and simultaneously overturned Hannington.
Even though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly
adopted the doctrine of express authority in Reutzel, the Pennsyl-
vania legislature should codify a law regarding the type of author-
ity than an attorney must possess in order to settle his client's
cause of action. Such action by the legislature would prevent any
future confusion in the interpretation of precedent, and would en-
sure that a uniform requirement of authority is used in negotiat-
ing settlement agreements within the state.'" The legislature has
been presented with two different doctrines to adopt: the doctrine
of express authority espoused within the recent case law of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or the doctrine of apparent author-
ity, which Chief Justice Cappy discussed in his concurring opinion
in Reutzel.'4
The doctrine of express authority may have its proponents;




142. Hannington, 809 A.2d at 410 n.4.
143. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 789-91.
144. Lodowski, 307 A.2d at 441.
145. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 794-95 (Cappy, C.J., concurring).
548 Vol. 44
Reutzel v. Douglas
adopt the doctrine of apparent authority as codified in section 27
of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.'46 The
apparent authority doctrine focuses on the client's manifestations,
instead of the attorney's, in order to determine whether an attor-
ney has the necessary authority to settle the case."' This ap-
proach, in contrast with that of the express authority doctrine,
allows the client to maintain complete control in the settlement of
his cause of action. Under this doctrine, a binding settlement
agreement cannot be reached unless the third party reasonably
believes, through interaction with the client, that the client pro-
vided such authority to his attorney.1 4' Therefore, the apparent
authority doctrine prevents an attorney from fraudulently or mis-
takenly manifesting client consent, since the third party's basis of
authority stems directly from the client's actions. 49
The doctrine of apparent authority better serves the public pol-
icy goal in Pennsylvania by promoting settlement agreements.150
Clients are more willing to settle their cause of action when they
maintain direct control over what settlement terms are accept-
able. The nature of the apparent authority doctrine encourages
clients to actively engage in settlement negotiations because with-
out their participation, the third party has nothing from which to
conclude the attorney has the necessary authority to settle the
case.
In addition, the doctrine of apparent authority fosters more
trust in the attorney-client relationship. Unlike the express au-
thority doctrine, an attorney cannot act with apparent authority
independently of his client. Apparent authority is not something
an attorney can claim to possess, instead, it must be outwardly
manifested by the client in a manner which would give notice of
such authority to a third party.
A settlement agreement executed under the express authority
doctrine is invalidated upon any finding that authorization was
not expressly given; however, this seemingly fair principle results
146. Id. at 793. Apparent authority is considered to be present to the extent that a cli-
ent causes a reasonable belief in a third party that the lawyer is authorized to act on the
client's behalf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 27 (2000).
147. RESTATEMENT (TIURD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 27 (2000).
148. Id. at cmt. c. This Restatement comment discusses the doctrine of apparent author-
ity and its combination of both subjective and objective elements, which provides greater
assurance to the third party that the settlement agreement was the desired outcome of the
client. Id.
149. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 794 (Cappy, C.J., concurring).
150. Id. at 795.
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in many settlement agreements being overturned because an at-
torney manifested express consent that he did not actually pos-
sess. In addition, the evidence necessary to prove or disprove the
existence of express consent between a client and attorney is often
protected by attorney-client privilege and is, therefore, unavail-
able to the third party."' This is an unfair result to the third
party, who typically bears the burden of proof in order to show
that the attorney was not acting under the express authority of
the client. 5'
In contrast, fewer settlement agreements are reneged under the
apparent authority doctrine because the authority underlying the
settlement agreement is based upon the client's manifestations,
not the attorney's.'53 As long as the third party reasonably con-
strued the client's manifestations as providing authority to his
attorney, the settlement agreement will be upheld.' The princi-
ples of fairness prevail when a client is bound to an agreement
that was reached under authority which the client objectively pro-
vided to his counsel, satisfying the other negotiating parties that
the necessary authority was present.
The agent-principal relationship inherent in the doctrine of ex-
press authority does not serve to promote the Pennsylvania public
policy goals, and instead allows the client to be bound by authority
which his attorney fraudulently or mistakenly manifests.'55 If the
Pennsylvania legislature adopted the doctrine of apparent author-
ity as codified in section 27 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers, the legislature would ensure that the ulti-
mate control in settlement agreements rests in the client's hands,
putting more trust in the attorney-client relationship, and prompt-
ing more clients to settle their causes of action.
Leann M. Petrilla
151. Id. at 794.
152. 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 173 (2004).
153. Reutzel, 870 A.2d at 795 (Cappy, C.J., concurring).
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 27 cmt. c (2000).
155. Id. at cmt. b.
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